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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-2-2(4) 
(1988). 
Appellant's appeal is from a final judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
dated December 7, 1988. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court correct in holding that the 
original (December 1985) Trustee's Sale, which followed a 
partially inaccurate Notice of Default, valid and therefore the 
subsequent (April 16, 1986) Trustee's Sale was of no effect? 
2. Was the trial court justified in awarding 
attorneys' fees and costs to defendants who prevailed on the 
only contested issue, although a judgment resulted in favor of 
plaintiff? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts were stipulated to at the 
beginning of the trial or were found as a result of the trial: 
1. Defendants were involved in developing and 
building housing projects. On January 28, 1983, they obtained 
a loan for $825,000 from R. Richards Woodbury, Mortgage 
Corp., secured by a Trust Deed on certain real property located 
in Uintah County, Utah. The Trust Deed identified defendants 
as trustors; it was dated January 28, 1983 and recorded 
February 2, 1983, in Book 325 at Page 133, as Document 
No. 199115 of the Records of the Uintah County Recorder. The 
loan was subsequently assigned to plaintiff. (Plaintiff's 
First Amended Complaint, para. 3; Defendants' Answer, para. 3; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "2" Multi-Family Deed of Trust.) 
2. Defendants fell behind in their obligation to 
pay the debt and on July 26, 1985, plaintiff caused a Notice of 
Default to be recorded. The Notice of Default identified the 
Trust Deed as No. 199115, stated the name of the defendants as 
trustors, gave the Book No. as 325, and the Page No. as 13 3. 
The Notice also gave an incomplete description of the 
property. (See Court Transcript, p. 4, lines 5-12; Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "4.") 
3. Plaintiff caused an Amended Notice of Default 
to be filed on September 9, 1985, which contained a complete 
description of the property. (See Court Transcript, p. 4, 
lines 13-18; Plaintiff's Exhibit V5.") 
4. A Notice of Sale containing a complete 
description of the property was mailed to defendants on 
November 13, 1985, scheduling a trustee's sale for December 16, 
1985. (See Court Transcript, p. 4, lines 19-21; Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "6," Notice of Trustee's Sale.) 
5. More than the required three months had 
transpired between the date of the Notice of Default (July 26, 
1985) and the Notice of Sale (November 13, 1985). Slightly 
more than two months had expired between the date of the 
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Amended Notice of Default (September 9, 1985) and the Notice of 
Sale. 
6. On December 16, 1985, the Trustee's Sale was 
held, and the only bid entered was by plaintiff in the amount 
of $983,086.33, resulting in a deficiency of about $7,000.00. 
(See Court Transcript, p. 4, lines 22-25; p. 10, lines 6-12.) 
7. Plaintiff did not record a trustee's deed 
from the sale, but did file a deficiency notice within three 
months of the December 16, 1985 Trustee's Sale. 
8. Plaintiff initiated a second Notice of Sale 
in March 1986, three months after the Trustee's Sale of 
December 1985, announcing a second Trustee's Sale to be held 
April 16, 1986. Plaintiff was the only bidder at the second 
sale, entering a bid of only $400,000 in this effort to 
purchase the property a second time. (See Court Transcript, p. 
5, lines 1-10.) 
9. Plaintiff filed an Amended Deficiency Notice 
claiming the second sale was valid, asking for a deficiency 
judgment of $608,287.61 based on the second sale. 
10. Defendants defended by contending that the 
original Notice of Default was sufficient to impart notice of 
the property at issue, and also that plaintiff could not take 
advantage of any technical defect in the Notice to set aside 
the original sale. Defendants claimed the original sale was 
the valid sale and stipulated at trial to the $7,339.44 
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deficiency from that sale when that issue was raised for the 
first time at trial by plaintiff. 
11. The trial court held that the December 1985 
sale was valid, and that therefore the April 1986 sale was of 
no effect. The court entered a judgment for the $7,339.44 
stipulated as the deficiency from the December 1985 sale. The 
court also awarded attorneys1 fees and costs to defendants of 
$4,451.98 to be offset against the $7,339.44. (See Court 
Transcript, p. 10, lines 6-14.) The court also noted that 
plaintiff had recovered attorneys1 fees accrued to the date of 
sale in the amount stipulated as owed by defendants at the date 
of sale. (See Court Transcript p. 11, lines 1-9.) 
12. The court based its ruling on its finding 
that the original Notice of Default imparted sufficient notice 
of the object of the default and on the Utah Supreme Court 
decision of Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Serv., 
743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987). (See Court Transcript, p. 4, lines 
1-4.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Third District Court decision that the December 
16, 1985 trustee's sale was valid because the Amended Notice 
of Default did not affect the three-month notice period in any 
way, was justified for each of two reasons. 
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First, the statute controlling the Notice of Default, 
Utah Code Ann, §57-1-24, does not require a complete property 
description since the Trust Deed was identified correctly with 
the information specified by the statute. 
Second, even if the property description were not 
complete, the omission was not a material irregularity 
sufficient to set aside the completed sale, because the purpose 
of §57-1-24 is to protect the defendants' property rights, and 
the defendants did not claim any harm from the process. 
Defendants also argue that the award to them of 
attorneys1 fees and costs was proper since they were the 
prevailing parties with regard to the only contested issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
DECEMBER 1985 TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS VALID BECAUSE THE 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT FILED JULY 26, 1985, CONFORMED TO 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-24 (1967). 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967), Sale of Trust 
Property by Trustee - Notice of Default, provides: 
The power of sale herein conferred upon the 
trustee shall not be exercised until: 
(a) the trustee shall file first for 
record, in the office of the recorder 
of each county wherein the trust 
property or some part or parcel 
thereof is situated, a notice of 
default, identifying the Trust Deed 
by stating the name of the trustor 
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named therein and giving the book and 
page where the same is recorded or 
a description of the trust property, 
and containing a statement that a 
breach of an obligation for which the 
trust property was conveyed as 
security has occurred and setting 
forth the nature of such breach and of 
his election to sell or cause to be 
sold such property to satisfy the 
obligation. 
(b) not less than three months shall 
thereafter elapse; and 
(c) after the lapse of at least three 
months the trustee shall give notice 
of sale as provided in this act. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Notice of Default was filed in the case at bar on 
July 26, 1985. The Notice complied with the requirements of 
§57-1-24 because it "identified the Trust Deed by stating the 
name of the trustor and gave the book and page where the same 
was recorded." The "or" preceding "description of the trust 
property" in §57-1-24(a) makes description of the property 
optional, to be provided if the Trust Deed is not identified as 
required. An incomplete property description supplied in the 
notice in addition to the required information did not negate 
the sufficiency of the notice nor defeat the purpose of the 
statute. 
The purpose of the strict notice requirements in a 
nonjudicial sale of property secured by a Trust Deed is to 
"inform persons with an interest in the property of the pending 
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sale of that property so that they may act to protect those 
interests." Concepts, Inc. v, First Security Realty Serv., 
743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987). The precise identification of 
the Trust Deed met the statutory notice requirements and gave 
defendants sufficient notice of the impending trustee's sale to 
cure the default had they been able. 
The trustee filed the Notice of Sale on November 13, 
1985 after the required three-month waiting period, which the 
court below calculated to have expired by October 25, 1985. 
(See Court Transcript, p. 8, lines 12-20.) The Notice of Sale 
fully described the property to be sold, and that property was 
sold on December 16, 1985, without objection by defendants, 
whose interests the trustee's sale notice requirements are 
intended to protect. 
Defendants also argued that even if the incomplete 
property description were found to be an irregularity in the 
notice requirement of §57-1-24, such irregularity was 
immaterial, and "immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect 
the sufficiency of the notice or the sale made pursuant 
thereto." Concepts, Inc., 743 P.2d at 1159. Also, "a 
trustee sale once made will not be set aside unless the 
interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there was some 
attendant fraud or unfair dealing." Id. at 1160. 
Having been put on notice by the July 1985 Notice of 
Default that the entire loan balance was declared due, 
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defendants had no reason to expect anything but a complete sale 
of the property conveyed by the Trust Deed. Defendants did not 
protest when the Notice of Sale was delivered to them slightly 
less than three months after the Amended Notice of Default was 
filed. 
The Third District concluded the Amended Notice 
"didn't affect in any way[,] shape or form the 90-day notice 
period contemplated by the statute; didn't shorten it in any 
way to the . . .defendants." (See Court Transcript, p. 8, 
lines 21-25.) 
The plaintiff's argument that the omission in the 
property description invalidates the sale, "perverts and uses 
as a sword a statute that was meant to shield the property 
rights of trustor [defendants]." Concepts, Inc., 743 P.2d at 
1160. Only plaintiff took exception to the adequacy of the 
notice, arguing for the validity of the unnecessary second 
sale, which with four months of hindsight would allow plaintiff 
to pay a substantially lower price than plaintiff bid at the 
first sale. 
The plaintiff has not been deprived of the benefit of 
its bargain by validation of the December 1985 sale. The Third 
District found that plaintiff received an accurate Notice of 
Sale fully describing the property to be sold, and that there 
was nothing in the December 1985 sale which would have misled 
any buyer as to what was up for auction. (See Court 
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Transcript, p. 9, lines 23-25; p. 10, lines 1-5.) Plaintiff, 
who initiated the Trustee's Sale, had ample opportunity to 
appraise the value of the property before bidding at the 
December 1985 sale, where plaintiff was the only bidder. The 
stipulated facts show that the loan in which plaintiff acquired 
a beneficial interest was made on the basis of an eighty 
percent loan-to-value ratio in January of 1983. Therefore, 
plaintiff's bid of approximately the outstanding loan balance 
was a logical bid in December 1985. The Third District also 
found that the "record is absent of any evidence of fraud." 
(See Court Transcript, p. 6, lines 24-25.) 
The July 1985 Notice of Default complied with the 
requirements of §57-1-24. The incomplete description of 
property was either of no effect or was an immaterial error in 
the notice. The defendants, whom the statute is intended to 
protect, did not protest the irregularity in the notice, and 
allowed the sale to go forward without objection. The 
incomplete description did not harm the plaintiff, who 
initiated the procedure and had ample opportunity to appraise 
the value of the property before making a bid at the December 
1985 sale. No evidence of fraud was presented at trial. The 
decision of the Third District Court that the December 1985 
sale was valid should therefore be upheld. 
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II. 
THE AWARD FOR ATTORNEYS1 FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS 
WAS PROPER AS THE DEFENDANTS WERE THE 
PREVAILING PARTIES. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1985) provides that "in 
any action brought under this section, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to collect his costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
A party may be the prevailing party if he is 
successful with regard to the main issues. Cooper v. 
Carlson, 511 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Alaska 1973). "It has been 
established by case law that the prevailing party is the one 
who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends 
against it, prevailing on the main issue." Id. 
A party who is successful in defeating a claim of 
great potential liability may be the prevailing party even 
though the other side is successful in receiving an affirmative 
recovery. Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C.R. Lewis Co., 497 
P.2d 312 (Alaska 1972). In Owen Jones, the defendant Lewis 
was awarded attorneys1 fees for having successfully defended 
against a contract claim of $119,663.12, even though recovery 
against Lewis of $7,363.12 was permitted in quantum meruit 
for material salvaged. The plaintiffs in Owen Jones 
contended that only they could be the prevailing parties 
because of their affirmative recovery of $7,3 63.12 at the 
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conclusion of the trial. But, the court did not agree; "it is 
not an immutable rule that the party who obtains an affirmative 
recovery must be considered the prevailing party." Id. at 
313-14. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff's entire claim for 
relief was based on the invalid Trustee's Sale of April 1986 
and the alleged deficiency said to have resulted. (See First 
Amended Complaint, paras. 9, 11, 12; Plaintiff's Trial 
Memorandum, Record at p. 000072.) Defendants asserted that the 
property was sold at the prior and valid Trustee's Sale of 
December 1985. (See Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum, Record at, 
p. 000072.) Defendants stipulated to the $7,339.44 deficiency 
from the December 1985 sale as soon as plaintiff indicated that 
it claimed a small deficiency from the first sale and for the 
first time presented the calculation at trial. Since the court 
below held the December 1985 sale to be valid (see Court 
Transcript, p. 10, lines 6-10), and therefore the April 1986 
sale to be invalid, the defendants prevailed on the main and 
only contested issue, even though an affirmative judgment for 
$7,3 39.44, which was stipulated, was entered against defendants. 
The decision of the court below to award attorneys' 
fees to defendants is also supported by Utah Code Ann. 
§57-1-27 (1985), which provides in part that: 
Each bid is considered an irrevocable 
offer, and if the purchaser refuses to pay 
the amount bid by him for the property sold 
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to him at the sale . . . . the party 
refusing to pay the bid price is liable for 
any loss occasioned by the refusal 
including interest, costs and trustees1 and 
reasonable attorneys1 fees. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, 
defendants asked for attorneys' fees incurred in defending 
against plaintiffs1 claim that the December 1985 sale was 
invalid. The defense of this action became necessary because 
plaintiff failed to honor its successful bid at the December 
1985 sale. An award of attorneys' fees to defendants is 
consistent with the statutes allowing such fees, and the 
decision of the court below should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The December 16, 1985 Trustee's Sale was valid 
because the Trust Deed was properly identified in one of the 
two alternative ways required by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24, and 
the incomplete property description included in the Notice 
of Default filed July 26, 1985 was either of no effect or was 
an immaterial error in the notice procedure. The purpose of 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 is to shield the rights of 
defendants, and plaintiff cannot use the statute as a sword to 
set aside the sale where there was no material error or 
evidence of fraud. 
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The award of attorneys' fees and costs to defendants 
as the prevailing parties was proper because defendants 
prevailed on the main and only contested issue, even though an 
affirmative judgment of $7,339.44, which was stipulated, was 
entered against defendants. 
The judgment of the Third District Court below should 
be upheld on both issues. 
Z^ J 
DATED this L-' day of June, 1989. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Davies 
:ney for Defendants/ 
Respondents 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage 
prepaid on this (p^ day of June, 1989, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Glen W. Roberts 
Walker Kennedy III 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
2 677 East Parleys Way 
Salt Lake City,AUtaffix84109 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Woodbury Bettilyon and Kesler w^e**-*^ _ _ P * > ^ 
353 East 200 South, SLC, UT 84111 
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NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
The undersigned, ASSOCIATED TITLE CO., Trustee, hereby gives 
Notice of Default and of the exercise of its election to declare all sums 
secured by the Trust Deed hereinafter described to be immediately due 
and payable. 
This notice relates to a Trust Deed executed by, DANIEL S. MEHR & 
KATHRYN C. MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II & DEBORAH L. MEHR as Trustor, ASSOCIATED 
TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORP., as 
Beneficiary, dated January 28, 1983, recorded February 2, 1983, in Book 325 
at Page 133, as Document No. 199115 of the records of the Uintah, County 
Recorder, covering the following described property to-wit: 
PARCEL I 
Beginning 65 rods East and 317 feet North of the South quarter corner 
of Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence East 125 feet; thence South 70 feet; 
thence West 125 feet; thence North 70 feet to the place of beginning, 
and being within the unplatted part of Vernal City, Uintah County, 
Utah. 
Beginning 65 rods East and 220 feet North of the South quarter corner 
of Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North 27 feet; thence East 125 feet; 
thence North 70 feet thence East 117.2 feet, more or less, to the East 
line of the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter section of said 
section; thence South 152 feet; thence West 125 feet, more or less, to 
the East property line of Robert Lowell Robbins and Ardith H. Robbins 
as acquired by Warranty Deed, recorded November 11, 1971, as Entry No. 
127337, in Book 172, at Page 112 of official records, thence North 55 
feet; thence West 105 feet to the place of beginning, and being within 
the unplatted part of Vernal City, Uintah County, Utah. 
Parcel 2 
Beginning 23 rods North of the Southeast corner of the Southwest 
quarter of the Southeast quarter, Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 
21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 242.13 
feet; thence South 3 rods 13 feet; thence East 242.13 feet more or 
less to the l/16th line; thence North 3 rods 13 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
This Trust Deed was assigned to OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS 
BANK formerly known as NEBRASKA SAVING and LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A. 
r 2 PLAINTIFF'S 1 EXHIBIT 
Xf 
A breach of an obligation for which the trust property was conveyed 
as security, has occurred consisting of the following: Payments for 
January through July, 1985, for a total delinquency of $83,128.24, are due 
and payable. Said breach can be cured by payment of said sum, plus 
additional payments and interest that may accrue hereafter. 
In the event of your failure to cure said breach within ninety days 
after the recording of this Notice of Default, the Beneficiary shall and 
does hereby elect to exercise its option to declare all sums secured by the 
Trust Deed above described to be immediately due and payable without 
further notice to you. At the ena of said ninety day period the Trustee 
elects to sell or cause to be sold such property to satisfy the obligation 
due under the note. 
You are further advised of your right to bring a court action to 
assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense you may have 
to the acceleration and sale of the property. 
By reason of such default, OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL 
SAVINGS BANK fka NEBRASKA SAVING, the present beneficiary under 
said Trust Deed, has executed and delivered to Trustee a written 
Declaration of Default and demand for sale and has deposited with said 
Trustee such Trust Deed and all documents evidencing obligations secured 
thereby, and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured 
thereby immediately due and payable, and has elected and does hereby 
elect to cause the trust properties to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
secured thereby. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 1985. 
Verden E. Bettilyon / 
Attorney for Trustee 
STATE OF Utah ) 
COUNTY OF Salt Lake ) 
x\\, --On the* L8th day of July, 1985, personally appeared before me, Verden 
^£*.^Battilycn^\Attorney at Law, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who 
^3§5pk/yjw^'ge to me that he executed the same. 
)ss, 
v 
-y***-* j ~ " •*£> 
' ^ V Commission Expires: 5-18-89 n&JUt^ep i4&bfc&jff^ 
te'Sidi-ntjVat: Bountiful, Utah Notary Public 
APPENDIX "B" 
.^ie Jilfj-'r
 :(VX<} tyMAZLjlA — f f r ^ & x & W ^ Uintah County RecorCe 
4 ^ Bv trwus^ QC^f<'Ato\^\/ Oeouty Book - ~ ^ 7 Page 1 
When recorded return to: 
Verden E. Bettilyon 
Woodbury Bettilyon and Kesler 
2677 East Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
AMENDED NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
The undersigned, ASSOCIATED TITLE CO., Trustee, hereby gives Notice 
of Default and of the exercise of its election to declare all sums secured 
by the Trust Deed hereinafter described to be immediately due and payable. 
This notice relates to a Trust Deed executed by, DANIEL S. MEHR & 
KATHRYN C. MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II & DEBORAH L. MEHR as Trustor, ASSOCIATED 
TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORP., as 
Beneficiary, dated January 28, 1983, recorded February 2, 1983, in Book 325 
at Page 133, as Document No. 199115 of the records of the Uintah, County 
Recorder, covering the following described property to-wit: 
PARCEL I 
Beginning 65 rods East and 317 feet North of the South quarter corner of 
Secticn 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence East 125 feet; thence South 70 feet; thence West 125 
feet; thence North 70 feet to the place of beginning, and being within the 
unplatted part of Vernal City, Uintah County, Utah. 
Beginning 65 rods East and 220 feet North of the South quarter corner of 
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence North 27 feet; thence East 125 feet; thence North 70 
feet thence East 117.2 feet, more or less, to the East line of the 
Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter section of said section; thence 
South 152 feet; thence West 125 feet, more or less, to the East property 
line of Robert Lowell Robbins and Ardith H. Robbins as acquired by Warranty 
Deed, recorded November 11, 1971, as Entry No. 127337, in Book 172, at Page 
112 of official records, thence North 55 feet; thence West 105 feet to the 
place of beginning, and being within the unplatted part of Vernal City, 
Uintah County, Utah. 
Parcel 2 
Beginning 23 rods North of the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of 
the Southeast quarter, Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 242.13 feet; thence South 3 
rods 13 feet; thence East 242.13 feet more or less to the l/16th line; 
thence North 3 rods 13 feet to the place of beginning. 
ALSO: Lots 21, 22 and 23 of the proposed CENTRAL PART, PLAT "A", a 
subdivision located in Section 26 Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, in Uintah County, Utah. 
EXHIBIT 
!Cs^ 
-^^. 
415 
This Trust Deed was assigned to OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS 
BANK formerly known as NEBRASKA SAVING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A. 
A breach of an obligation for which the trust property was conveyed as 
security, has occurred consisting of the following: Payments for 
January through July, 1985, for a total delinquency of $83,128,24, are due 
and payable. Said breach can be cured by payment of said sum, plus 
additional payments and interest that may accrue hereafter. 
In the event of your failure to cure said breach within ninety days 
after the recording of this Notice of Default, the Beneficiary shall and 
does hereby elect to exercise its option to declare all sums secured by the 
Trust Deed above described to be immediately due and payable without 
further notice to you. At the end of said ninety day period the Trustee 
elects to sell or cause to be sold such property to satisfy the obligation 
due under the note. 
You are further advised of your right to bring a court action to 
assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense you may have to 
the acceleration and sale of the property. 
By reason of such default, OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK 
formerly known as NEBRASKA SAVING and LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A., the present 
beneficiary under said Trust Deed, has executed and delivered to Trustee a 
written Declaration of Default and demand for sale and has deposited with 
said Trustee such Trust Deed and all documents evidencing obligations 
secured thereby, and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured 
thereby immediately due and payable, anG has elected and does hereby elect 
to cause the trust properties to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured 
thereby. 
DATED this 6th day of September, 1985. 
Verden E. Bettilyon 
Attorney for Trustee 
STATE OF Utah ) 
COUNTY OF Salt Lake ) 
)ss. 
. ^>*"\ ./t73r>'the 6th day of September, 1985, personally appeared before me, 
/ / ^ \ ^ P f i f e I l E^ Be t t i l yon , Attorney at Law, the signer of the foregoing 
K
^in%truiw^9 who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the same. 
^^H^y/P^onajiiysTon Expires: 5-18-89 ^n^d^tJ^ y ^ / ^ > - ^ ^ ^ 
* V \ Keslthtig-'St: Boun t i f u l , Utah Notary Public * 
APPENDIX "C" 
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
The following described property will be sold at public auction to the 
highest bidder, purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States 
at the time of sale. The sale to be held at the 401 County Bid,, South 
Door, Vernal, Utah 84078, County of Uintah, State of Utah, on December 16, 
1985 at 12 Moon of said day for the purpose of foreclosing a Trust Deed 
executed by DANIEL S. MEHR & KATHRYN C. MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II & DEBORAH 
L. MEHR as Trustor, in favor of RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORP. as 
Beneficiary; covering real property located in Uintah County, and more 
particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL I 
Beginning 65 rods East and 317 feet North of the South quarter corner of 
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence East 125 feet; thence South 70 feet; thence West 125 
feet; thence North 70 feet to the place of beginning, and being within the 
unplatted part of Vernal City, Uintah County, Utah. 
Beginning 65 rods East and 220 feet North of the South quarter corner of 
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence North 27 feet; thence East 125 feet; thence North 70 
feet thence East 117.2 feet, more or less, to the East line of the 
Southwest quarter of the Southeast auarter section of said section; thence 
South 152 feet; thence West 125 feet, more or less, to the East property 
line of Robert Lowell Robbins and Ardith H. Robbins as acquired by Warranty 
Deed, recorded November 11, 1971, as Entry No. 127337, in Book 172, at Page 
112 of official records, thence North 55 feet; thence West 105 feet to the 
place of beginning, and being within the unplatted part of Vernal City, 
Uintah County, Utah. 
Parcel 2 
Beginning 23 rods North of the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of 
the Southeast quarter, Section 23, Townstiip 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 242.13 feet; thence South 3 
rods 13 feet; thence East 242.13 feet more or less to the l/16th line; 
thence North 3 rods 13 feet to the place of beginning. 
ALSO: Lots 21, 22 and 23 of the proposed CENTRAL PART, PLAT "A", a 
subdivision located in Section 26 Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, in Uintah County, Utah. 
ADDRESS of Property: 429, 439, 449, 459 South 200 East; 823, 839, 875 South 
50 East, Vernal, Utah. 
This Trust Deed was assigned to OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS 
BANK fka NEBRASKA SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A. 
DATED this 13th day of November, 1985. 
ner^n E- lell}}y°n
 A J ' ~*"I J PLAINTIFFS 
Woodbury, Bettilyon and Kesler I .- EXHIBIT 
Attorney for Trustee II / 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA 
FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DANIEL S. MEHR, KATHRYN C 
MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II, 
and DEBORAH L. MEHR, 
Defendants. 
D) xv/7 
C a s e N o . C 8 6 - 1 9 0 5 
DECISION 2 - 3 - 8 8 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3rd day of 
February, 1988, this cause came on for trial before 
the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, District Court, with a 
jury in the Salt Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S ; 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendants: 
JEFFREY C. SWINTON & 
GLEN ROBERTS 
Attorneys at Law 
19 West South Temple #700 
SLC, Utah 84101 
LYNN S. DAVIES 
P.O. Box 2465 
SLC, Utah 84110 
CAT by: CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR 
1 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: I had indicated in chambers 
3 my mental processes in terms of trying to rule on the 
4 spot, and that doesn't mean that I have haven't 
5 thoughtfully considered the issues because I've had at 
6 least the benefit of an evening and all during the 
7 day. The decision I'm called upon to make is not an 
8 easy one, but I do have a firm recollection at the 
9 pretrial hearing that it was clear at that time what 
10 Mr. Davies' principal point of attack would be. And 
11 so I don't think that comes as a great surprise on 
12 what his major spear was. The only thing he was just 
13 short on the Concepts case, and that may be -- I can't 
14 recall -- I don't have the file in front of me. Maybe 
15 the pretrial was even before that decision issued, but 
16 the decision was recent enough that that might explain 
17 why he didn't know about* it. 
18 MR. DAVIES: I think those were the 
19 principal defenses we raised in our answer too, your 
20 Honor. All through, that's been our intention. 
21 THE COURT: Given that, the Court does 
22 feel that there is sufficient guidance set forth to 
23| the Court in the Concepts case that I'm reasonably 
24 I bound by, and I don't know that I'm particularly happy 
25 I about it. It puts the defendants in a favored 
2 
position that I'm not sure that they ought to be in. 
Lenders lend money I suppose as 
entrepreneurs like anyone else; taking the risk of 
bust and boom and whatever, and that's a real thing to 
a banker or an insurance company. And I think there's 
an interesting contrast. As I recall, First Security 
was discussed in Forbes, and their poor performance 
was discussed against a backdrop of portfolio real 
estate investments, and that was contrasted with Zions 
Bank that performed better on average because they had 
opted to get into consumer credit in a bigger way. 
Those bankers understand, and they ought 
to understand, and they take those risks. But in 
addition to the property security and the real estate 
cycles that take place, they also take their risks 
based upon the personal integrity and value of the 
personal and individual 'Signatures on those 
obligations. And if the defendants signed the 
obligations, it wasn't only the property that was at 
risk and your down payment that was at risk, it was 
your personal fortunes and finances that were at risk 
as well by the transaction. 
So, to that extent, I've been very, very 
troubled about the decision that I feel that I must 
make. 
Under the Concepts v. First Security 
Realty Service case, I think the Court is compelled to 
make the following findings, reach the following 
cone lusions . 
Consistent with the stipulation entered 
into on the record by the attorneys at the outset of 
the trial, the Court finds that on July 26f 1985, a 
notice of default, 90-day notice of default, was 
recorded concerning the property in Uintah County. 
That notice failed to describe one of the two parcels 
of four-plexes involved in this case, the three-unit 
piece of property. 
The Court further finds that on 
September 9, 1985, an amended notice of default went 
out -- or was recorded describing both the parcels 
including the four duplexes -- or the four, 
four-plexes as well as the parcel with the three 
four-plexes. 
The Court finds that on November 13, 
1985, a notice of trustee's sale went out setting up a 
trustee's sale on December 16, 1985. 
The Court finds that that sale went 
forward, and at that sale, the plaintiff holding the 
beneficial interest under the trust deed bid in the 
property at $963,086.33. 
4 
1 Thereafter, the beneficiary -- or the 
2 plaintiff holding the beneficial interest, in 
3 reviewing the matter with the trustee, determined that 
4 there was a defective procedure that had been 
5 employed, and initiated a second series of notices, 
6 the notice of default, the notice of sale, and went 
7 through the process again; ultimately resulting in a 
8 second sale of the properties in question on April the 
9 16th, 1986. At which sale, the plaintiff bid in the 
10 property at $400,000. 
-11 Consistent with the jury's findings, the 
12 Court finds that on December 16, 1985, the fair market 
13 value of the property was $425,000. And based upon 
14 the stipulation of the parties, the amount of the 
15 indebtedness including cost, fees and everything was 
16 $970,425.77. 
17 The Court further finds consistent with 
18 the jury's verdict that on April 16, 1985, the fair 
19 market value was $375,000, that the amount due 
20 including costs, fees and the costs of sale was in the 
21 amount of $1,022,442.11. 
22 The Court reserves the issue with 
23 respect to fees and costs attributable to this 
24 proceeding. It having an affidavit -- is that --
25 maybe I ought to make sure on the record. 
5 
1 Does that 1,022,000 include the 
2 affidavit submitted by plaintiffs? 
3 MR. ROBERTS: No, it doesn't, your 
4 Honor. 
5 THE COURT: That's-what your 
6 understanding is, Mr. Davies? 
7 MR. DAVIES: That's my understanding. 
8 THE COURT: That's what your 
9 understanding is Mr. Davies, and at this point, you 
10 have not submitted an affidavit and the Court gave you 
11 five days leave to submit such affidavit. 
12 MR. DAVIES: Thank you, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Going from there to the 
14 specific findings I think I need to make under the 
15 Concepts case, the first thing that pops out at the 
16 Judge is not the first thing that popped out at Mr. 
17 Davies; which may indicate that judges jump through 
18 different hoops than advocates. 
19 At page 1159 of the decision, the Court 
20 points out that a party seeking to have a trustee sale 
21 set aside for irregularity, for want of notice or 
22 fraud has the burden of proving its contentions. So 
23 that's my starting point. 
24 I The Court specifically finds that the 
25| record is absent of any evidence of fraud, and it's 
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absent of any want of notice, and the Court does 
acknowledge the irregularity in the notice of default. 
The Court observes that the decision 
talks about the principle in several contexts several 
times in the decision, that the statutory sale 
provisions on a trustee's sale pertaining to 
extrajudicial sales are created for the benefit of the 
borrowers. 
And in that context, the Court would 
assume that it is the debtor or the obligor that's in 
the position to rely on strict performance with those 
notices unless there's some -- there's one bit of 
13 language in here about setting aside a sale in cases 
which reach unjust extremes. I suppose one could 
conclude that that result could be reached in this 
case would be an unjust extreme, but I don't think the 
construction of the statutes are meant to be applied 
in that fashion. 
The 90-day default period is set up for 
the benefit of a delinquent debtor or obligor, and 
during that 90 days under a trust deed, he has the 
opportunity to bring current delinquent amounts and 
costs to that date and cure the default. And the 
lender uses a trust deed with alternative remedies; 
namely treating it as a mortgage or as a trust deed. 
7 
1 And by accepting the benefits of an extrajudicial sale 
2 unsupervised by the Court, the lender gives up the 
3 remedy that's given to the borrower of the 90-day 
4 default period during which time a default can be 
5 cured. 
6 Once that's done, however, there is no 
7 six-month redemptive provision as there is in the case 
8 of a mortgage foreclosure. And so if you can't redeem 
9 within the 90 days plus the additional 30 days 
10 awaiting sale, then any remedies of the borrower are 
11 then foreclosed, and he's out the door. 
12 The notice was given in this case of the 
13 default, and was recorded July 26, 1985. The first 
14 sale took place December 16, and the 90 days then did 
15 not expire until October 26th -- or -- it's probably 
16 described in terms of three months. It expired 
17 probably the 25th of Ocbober of 1985, and then the 
18 notice of trustee's sale took place in mid-November. 
19 So you had your full 90-day period expire by the time 
20 that first notice went out. 
21 The amendment to the notice of default 
22 didn't affect in any way shape or form the 90-day 
23 notice period contemplated by the statute; didn't 
24 shorten it in any way to the debtors or obligors or 
25 the defendants in this case. 
8 
1 So, accordingly, the Court concludes 
2 that that amendment was a material defect in that 
3 notice which in a legal sense vitiated the 
4 effectiveness of the notice of default inasmuch as the 
5 defendants1 time to cure was not adversely affected in 
6 any way shape or form. 
7 The defendants were given the full 
8 benefit of the 90-day default period. They were given 
9 a full -- as I recall the statute is 30 days on 
10 trustee' s sale. 
-11 Is that right? You guys read every 
12 chapter and verse. 
13 MR. ROBERTS: Actually, your Honor, it 
14 provides that the publication was to occur three 
15 times, and you can't make the sale --
16 THE COURT: Before that. 
17 MR. ROBERTS: Before ten days has 
18 expired from the last publication, it must be done in 
19 20 days before that publication. 
20 THE COURT: So three weeks for the 
21 notices, and another ten days gives you roughly a 
22 month, and that full period of time hasn't expired. 
23 When the notices of sale -- or the 
24 notice of trustee sale went out, based upon the 
25 stipulation, the Court would find that the property 
9 
1 notice was accurate, describing both parcels, and that 
2 the subject of the sale was described accurately and 
3 with particularity, and there could have been nothing 
4 in the trustee's sale notice that would have misled 
5 any buyer as to what was up for auction. 
6 And because of that fact, the Court 
7 concludes that sale number one was a legally valid 
8 sale, and would order based upon the stipulations, the 
9 judgment enter in favor of the plaintiff against 
10 defendants for the approximate $7,000 attributable to 
Til the difference between the 963,086.33 and the 
12 970 ,425.27. 
13 The Court will award defendants their 
14 costs and attorney's fees. You have five days to 
15 submit your affidavit with respect to fees and costs, 
16 and the plaintiff has an additional five days to 
17 object to that affidavit and those costs. And if 
18 there's any substantial reason why those fees are not 
19 justified, then the Court would intend to hold an 
20 evidentiary hearing with respect to the reasonableness 
21 of defendants' fees, and permit you to put on evidence 
22 to justify those fees. 
23 Anything else? 
24 MR. ROBERTS: Are you not awarding 
25 plaintiffs its costs and fees in the action? 
10 
THE COURT: No. It wouldn't follow. I 
think you had -- your fees and costs that are 
reasonably allowable to the time of the sale, I had 
the understanding that the 970,425.27f which you 
stipulated to, was the amount of the indebtedness plus 
all of the costs of sale and attorney fees accrued as 
to that date. Is that inaccurate or --
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, accrued to that date 
for the foreclosure. 
THE COURT: And beyond that, I would 
award no fees other than to the defendants for the 
lit igat ion. 
Will you draft -- although we did submit 
to the jury two general verdict forms, which was a 
little unusual, but I think in a straight forward way 
to get to the jury, as I indicated earlier, I think 
the judgment is basically in the form of special 
verdicts, and I assume you'd follow the rules in terms 
of submitting a judgment. And I think it ought to 
contain those specific findings that I've made, and 
also the fact that I found that there's an absence of 
evidence in terms of plaintiff meeting its burden, 
burdens of fraud and irregularity. And I find that 
the irregularity in question is not material inasmuch 
as it did not impair the 90-day default period. 
11 
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We'll be in recess. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
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STATE OF UTAH 
County of SALT LAKE 
ss 
I, CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, do hereby certify that 
I an an Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary 
Public in and for the State of Utah; 
That I took down the proceedings aforesaid at 
the time and place therein named and thereafter 
reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided 
transcription (CAT) under my direction and control; 
I further certify that I have no interest in 
the event of this action. 
WITNESS I1Y HAND AND SEAL this the 8th day of 
16 I February, 1988. 
17 
(S ignatu re) 
CARLTON Yi WAY/f C3R, RPR, 
Notary Pub 1 ic vsLn_^ !nd for the 
State of Utah, residing at 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(Seal) 
My commission expires: 11-18-90 
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APPENDIX "E" 
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee — Notice of de-
fault. 
The power of sale herein conferred upon the trustee shall not be exercised 
until: 
(a) the trustee shall first file for record, in the office of the recorder of 
each county wherein the trust property or some part or parcel thereof is 
situated, a notice of default, identifying the trust deed by stating the 
name of the trustor named therein and giving the book and page where 
the same is recorded or a description of the trust property, and containing 
a statement that a breach of an obligation for which the trust property 
was conveyed as security has occurred, and setting forth the nature of 
such breach and of his election to sell or cause to be sold such property to 
satisfy the obligation; 
(b) not less than three months shall thereafter elapse; and 
(c) after the lapse of at least three months the trustee shall give notice 
of sale as provided in this act. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 6; 1967, ch. 
131, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Three-month time period. ruptcy court, does not suspend the running of 
Rule 601 of the Bankruptcy Act, which pro- the three-month time period required by this 
vides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition section. McCarthy v. Lewis, 615 P.2d 1256 
shall operate as a stay of any act to enforce a (Utah 1980). 
lien against property in custody of the bank-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 557. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages &* 346. 
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — Description of property 
— Time and place of sale. 
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the time and place of sale partic-
ularly describing the property to be sold (a) by publication of such notice, at 
least three times, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the last publica-
tion to be at least 10 days but not more than 30 days prior to the sale, in some 
newspaper having a general circulation in each county in which the property 
to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated, and (b) by posting such notice, at 
least 20 days before the date of sale, in some conspicuous place on the property 
to be sold and also in at least three public places of each city or county in 
which the property to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated. 
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CONVEYANCES 57-1-27 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 566. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages «= 354. 
57-1-27, Sale of trust property by trustee — Public auction 
— Conduct by attorney for trustee — Trustor 
may direct order in which trust property sold — 
Bids — Postponement of sale. 
On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale, the 
trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public auction 
to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee may conduct 
the sale and act at such sale as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in 
interest, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which the trust prop-
erty shall be sold when such property consists of several known lots or parcels 
which can be sold to advantage separately, and the trustee, or the attorney for 
the trustee, shall follow such directions. Any person, including the beneficiary 
or trustee, may bid at the sale. Every bid is considered an irrevocable offer, 
and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property 
sold to him at the sale, the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may again 
sell the property at any time to the highest bidder. The party refusing to pay 
the bid price is liable for any loss occasioned thereby, including interest, costs, 
and trustee's and reasonable attorney's fees. The trustee or the attorney for 
the trustee may thereafter reject any other bid of such person. 
The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he considers expedient, 
postpone the sale up to a period not to exceed 72 hours. Notice of such post-
ponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the 
time and place last appointed for the sale. No other notice of the postponed 
sale need be given unless the sale is postponed for longer than 72 hours 
beyond the date designated in the notice of sale. In the event of a longer 
postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and renoticed as provided for herein 
in the same manner as the original notice of sale is required to be given. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 9; 1985, ch. 68, 
I 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment m the first paragraph, inserted "or the 
attorney for the trustee" in four places, in-
cited "trustee, or the" at the beginning and 
<M»ted "for the trustee" at the end of the sec-
ond sentence, inserted "or trustee" in the 
s jrth sentence, substituted "bid is considered" 
l
(
ar
 ^
l d
 shall be deemed" and "property sold" 
•^ "property struck off' m the fifth sentence, 
«^»ded the former sixth sentence into the 
Present sixth and seventh sentences by substi-
iuune "the bid price" for "shall be" near the 
<nnning and adding "including interest, 
f * * and trustee's and reasonable attorney's 
'*-* at the end of the sixth sentence and delet-
ing "also, in his discretion" following "may" in 
the seventh sentence; and, in the second para-
graph, divided the former first sentence into 
the present first and second sentences, substi-
tuted "considers" for "deems" and "up to a pe-
riod not to exceed 72 hours" for "from time to 
time until it shall be completed and, in every 
such case, notice" at the end of the first sen-
tence, divided the former second sentence into 
the present third and fourth sentences, substi-
tuted "72 hours" for "one day" and "date" for 
"day" near the middle of the third sentence, 
and substituted "In the event of a longer post-
ponement, the sale shall be cancelled and 
renoticed as provided for herein" for "m which 
event notice thereof shall be given" at the be-
ginning of the fourth sentence. 
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CONVEYANCES 57-1-32 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J S. Mortgages § 550. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages <£= 334. 
57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to re-
cover balance due upon obligation for which 
trust deed was given as security — Collection of 
costs and attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust 
deed, a» hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as secu-
rity, and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which 
such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value at the 
date of sale of the property sold. The court may not render judgment for more 
than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, 
and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair 
market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought 
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, ch. and third sentences; added the fourth sentence; 
68, ^ 4. and made minor changes in phraseology and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- punctuation, 
ment deleted language from the end of the first 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Exclusive remedy. 
Out-of-state lands. 
Exclusive remedy. Out-of-state lands. 
Thu. statute provides the exclusive remedy Deficiency judgment protection requiring 
for securing a deficiency judgment following a that fair market value of property at time of 
sale of real property under a trust deed, sale be used as setoff is not extended to debtors 
thereby precluding the pursuance of any other whose obligations are secured by trust deeds on 
remedy once the sale has been made. Cox v. land outside Utah Bullington v. Mize, 25 Utah 
Green (Utah 1985) 696 P.2d 1209. 2d 173, 478 P.2d 500, 44 A.L.R.3d 910 (1970). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C J.S. Mortgages § 599. 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages <s= 375. 
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APPENDIX "F" 
1158 Utah 743 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
CONCEPTS, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and Ray Fry, individually, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, formerly 
known as Utah Mortgage Loan Corpo-
ration, a Utah corporation, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 20144. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 1, 1987. 
Trustors under trust deeds executed 
and delivered for development of real prop-
erty brought action seeking declaratory 
judgment that trustee's sale conducted un-
der power of sale provision in trust deed 
was valid, and that trustee was precluded 
from rescheduling second sale of same 
property. The Third District Court, Sum-
mit County, Philip Fishier, J., held that 
trustee's sale was void, and trustors ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) 
validity of sale was not affected by minor 
typographical error in publication of notice 
of foreclosure sale which stated that sale 
would take placp in previous year, and (2) 
trustee's failure to bring deficiency action 
within three months after sale of property 
terminated all of trustors' remaining obli-
gations. 
Reversed. 
1. Mortgages <3=>369(7) 
Party who seeks to have trustee sale 
set aside for irregularity, want of notice, or 
fraud has burden of proving his contention, 
it being presumed, in absence of evidence 
to contrary, that sale was regular. 
2. Mortgages <3=>369(2) 
Defects in notice of foreclosure sale 
that will authorize setting aside of sale 
must be those that would have effect of 
chilling bidding and causing inadequacy of 
price. 
3. Mortgages <S=>354 
Notice of trustee's foreclosure sale 
was not rendered invalid by fact that publi-
cation dated 1983 stated that sale would 
take place in 1982. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-25. 
4. Mortgages 0=375 
Trustee which purchased property in 
foreclosure sale could not bring deficiency 
action three months after sale, where valid-
ity of sale was not affected by minor typo-
graphical error in publication of notice of 
foreclosure sale. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-25. 
5. Mortgages <3=>369(2, 3) 
Sale once made will not be set aside 
unless interests of debtor were sacrificed 
or there was some attendant fraud or un-
fair dealing. 
6. Mortgages 0=335 
Maker of deed of trust with power of 
sale may condition exercise of power upon 
such conditions as he may describe. 
7. Mortgages <s=375 
Once trust deed sale has been made, 
trustee's exclusive remedy for deficiency is 
to institute deficiency action within three 
months of date of sale. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-
28(2), 57-1-32. 
B. Ray Zoll, Tom D. Branch, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
James Gilson, Salt Lake City, for defend-
ant and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judg-
ment in a declaratory judgment action, de-
claring a trustee's sale conducted under a 
power of sale provision in a trust deed void 
as a matter of law for failure to comply 
with section 57-1-25 of the Utah Convey-
ances Act. We reverse. 
Plaintiffs were trustors under trust 
deeds executed and delivered to defendant 
for the development of real property into 
the Park West Condominiums in Park City. 
Utah. The amount of the loan exceeded 
$3,000,000. When plaintiffs failed to per-
form under the trust deed notes and loan 
agreements, defendant filed a notice of de-
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fault On September 14, 1983, plaintiffs 
were served with a notice of sale to beheld 
on October 28, 1983. In compliance with 
statutory requirements, the notice was also 
posted on the property to be sold and in 
three public places in Summit County. De-
fendant also caused the notice to be pub-
lished in the Salt Lake Tribune on October 
3, 10, and 17 of 1983, as evidenced by an 
affidavit of publication. The notice was 
dated "This First Day of October 1983" 
and stated that the property "will be sold 
. . . at the Summit County Courthouse . . . 
on October 28, 1982 " (Emphasis add-
ed.) Defendant was the only purchaser 
and bidder at the sale. Although neither 
party has apprised this Court of the 
amount of the bid, it is our understanding 
that defendant bid an amount substantially 
less than the outstanding balance due un-
der the notes. The trustee passed title to 
viefendant by virtue of a trustee's deed. 
On April 2, 1984, and April 30, 1984, 
plaintiffs were served with a ten-da} sum-
mons advising them that an action had 
been commenced to "recover deficiency due 
under notes dated November 17, 1981, and 
February 2, 19S2." An affidavit in the 
record indicates that plaintiffs' attorney re-
fused to stipulate to the timeliness of the 
action l and was informed by counsel for 
defendant that a sale of the property would 
be rescheduled because of the typographi-
cal error in the Salt Lake Tribune notice 
misstating the year of the sale. This ac-
tion ensued, with claims for declaratory 
relief, injunction, and damages. 
The parties stipulated that the facts were 
not in dispute and that the sole legal issue 
before the trial court was the validity of 
the sale on October 28, 1983. Because 
disposition of a case by summary judgment 
denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, 
we review the facts and inferences in the 
hfcTht most favorable to the party against 
whom the judgment was granted. Atlas 
Corp. v. The Claris National Bank, 737 
P.2d 225 (Utah 1987). Where, as here, 
summary judgment is granted as a matter 
of law rather than fact, we are free to 
1. Section 57-1-32 of the Utah Conveyances Act 
requires an action to recover the balance due 
upon the obligation for which the trust deed 
reappraise the trial court's legal conclu-
sions. Id.; Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick 
Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 
1986). 
[1,2] The purpose of strict notice re-
quirements in a nonjudicial sale of property 
secuied by trust deed is to inform persons 
with an interest in the property of the 
pending sale of that property, so that they 
may act to protect those interests. Mor-
rell v. Arctic Trading Co., Inc., 21 Wash. 
App. 302, 5S4 P.2d 983 (1978). The objec-
tive of the notice is to prevent a sacrifice of 
the property. If that objective is attained, 
immaterial errors and mistakes will not 
affect the sufficiency of the notice or the 
sale made pursuant thereto. Russell v. 
Webster Springs National Bank, 164 
W.Va. 708, 265 S.E.2d 762 (1980). A party 
who seeks to have a trustee sale set aside 
for irregularity, want of notice, or fraud 
has the burden of proving his contention, it 
being presumed, in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, that the sale was regular. 
Id. Defects in the notice of foreclosure 
sale that will authorize the setting aside of 
the sale must be those that would have the 
effect of chilling the bidding and causing 
an inadequacy of price. Boyce v. Hughes, 
241 Ga. 357, 245 S.E.2d 308 (1978). The 
remedy of setting aside the sale will be 
applied only in cases which reach unjust 
extremes. McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d 
210 (Alaska 1978). 
With these guidelines before us, we ex-
amine the case at hand. The parties do not 
dispute the fact that the statutory notice 
requirements were strictly observed, ex-
cept that the notice by publication dated 
October 1, 19S3, stated that the sale would 
take place on October 28, 1982. Errors like 
these do not normally operate to vitiate a 
foreclosure sale. Russell, supra (sale was 
advertised for 10:00 a.m., EDT, on Novem-
ber 4, when on that date EST was in effect. 
Held: no substantial departure from provi-
sions of trust deed or notice of sale as to 
vitiate sale); Love 11 v. Rowan Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co., 46 N.C.App. 150, 264 
was given as sccuri'v to be commenced within 
three months after the sale of the property un-
der trust deed. 
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S.E.2d 743 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 
302 N.C. 150, 274 S.E.2d 170 (1981) (notice 
of foreclosure hearing was improperly giv-
en as 3 January 1978 when sent in Decem-
ber of 1978. Held: obviously inadvertent 
error was not enough to invalidate proceed-
ings); Hankins v. Administrator of Veter-
ans Affairs, 92 Nev. 578, 555 P.2d 483 
(1976) (sale was erroneously advertised to 
;ake place in North Las Vegas. Held: pro-
ceedings were not invalidated as plaintiffs 
were not misled by mistake); Bailey v. 
Pioneer Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation, 210 Va. 558, 172 S.E.2d 730 (1970) 
(first notice by publication left out place of 
sale. Held: substantial compliance with 
the requirements of the trust deed was 
sufficient, so long as parties were not af-
fected in a material way); Holzman v. 
Bristol County Savings Bank, 277 Mass. 
383, 178 N.E. 622 (1931) (notice stated that 
sale would be held June 9 "at 10 o'clock in 
the forenoon." The year was left out. 
Held: no one was likely to be misled by the 
omission from the notices in what year the 
sale was to take place). But, where the 
erroneous date had the effect of not adver-
tising the sale at all, the court held that 
presumably no one was informed of the 
actual date. Booker v. Feaeral Land 
Bank of New Orleans, 175 Miss. 281, 164 
So. 877 (1936). 
[3] The facts here are similar to those 
in RasselL Loveli, and Holzman. The lan-
guage of the notice by publication is in 
futuro, advising the public that the sale 
wrill be held at a future date. As such, it 
can hardly be argued, nor does defendant 
argue, that the notice confused bidders or 
resulted in an undervaluation of the proper-
ty. Defendant's statement that the incor-
rect date had the potential to mislead pro-
spective bidders is insufficient to conclude 
that it in fact did. 
[4] Defendant received the trustee's 
deed after the foreclosure sale of October 
28, 1983. Though the presumption of valid-
ity of sale is not conclusive and may be 
rebutted, Houston First American Sav-
ings v. Mustek, 650 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.1983), 
section 57-1-28(1) of the Utah Conveyances 
Act states that recitals in a trustee *s deed 
averring compliance with statutory require-
ments constitute prima facie evidence of 
such compliance and are conclusive evi-
dence in favor of bona fide purchasers and 
encumbrancers for value and without no-
tice. See also Triano v. First American 
Title Insurance Co. of Arizona, 131 Ariz. 
581, 643 P.2d 26 (1982). Defendant does 
not argue that it did not pay value, nor that 
it had notice of any irregularities in the 
foreclosure proceedings at the time of sale. 
Nonetheless, defendant now argues that as 
beneficiary under the trust deed and pur-
chaser at sale, it was not qualified as a 
bona fide purchaser, so as to be entitled "to 
rely on the recitals in the deed he receives 
from the trustee after the sale" (citing 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 303 
(Utah 1978)). Although we agree that de-
fendant was not a bona fide purchaser, 
that fact does not change the result in this 
case. 
[5,6] Defendant's argument that the 
flaw in the notice by publication invalidated 
the sale to it perverts and uses as a sword 
a statute that was meant to shield the 
property rights of a trustor/ A sale once 
made will not be set aside unless the inter-
ests of the debtor were sacrificed or there 
was some attendant fraud or unfair deal-
ing. McHue v. Church, 583 P.2d at 215, 
216. The maker of the deed of trust with 
power of sale may condition the exercise of 
the power upon such conditions as he may 
describe. Houston First American Sav-
ings, 650 S.\V.2d at 768. Indeed, defendant 
itself, in its memorandum in support of 
motion for summary judgment, as well 3S 
in its argument before this Court, repeated-
ly concedes that the right to set aside a 
trustee's sale is predicated upon the impair-
ment of the trustor's rights to the proper-
ty. "Publication notices protect the debt-
or's interest [and serve] to ensure the fair-
ness of the sale through competitive bid-
ding, thus securing the highest possible 
prices" (citing Comments, Validity of Poll-
er of Sale and Procedural Considerations 
in Its Exercise, 16 U.Kan.L.Rev. 611. 617 
(1968)). The reason for strict compliance 
with the statute "is to protect the property 
of the debtor'1 (citing University Savings 
Association v. Springwood Shopping Cen-
ter, 644 S.\V.2d 705, 706 (Tex.1982)). "The 
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grantor of the power is entitled to have his^  
directions obeyed; to have the proper no-
tice of sale given; to have it to take place 
at the time and place, and by the person 
appointed by him" (citing Houston First 
American Savings, 650 S.W.2d at 768, and 
quoting from Fuller v. O'Neal, 69 Tex. 
349, 6 S.W. 181 (1887)). "The right of a 
grantor of a deed of trust to have its 
provision strictly complied with to effect a 
valid foreclosure sale is absolute" (citing 
Harwath i\ Hudson, 654 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. 
App.1983)). "Statutes making recitals in a 
trustee's deed conclusi\e evidence of their 
truth, may operate to deprive the trustor 
(or those claiming under him) of property 
without due process of law, i.e., the oppor-
tunity for an individualized hearing" (citing 
P. Basye, Clearing Land Titles § 43, at 
165-69 (19S3 Supp.)). (All emphases ours.) 
[7] In short, there is nothing in defend-
ant's argument that would persuade us to 
adopt defendant s reasoning. The statutes 
governing foreclosure sales under trust 
deeds protected the interests of plaintiffs 
up to the moment that the property was 
sold and a trustee's deed issued. There-
after, the trustee's deed operated to comey 
to defendant, without right of redemption 
by plaintiffs, title to the property of plain-
tiffs and all parties claiming under them. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-2^2) (1986). De-
fendant thereafter had three months to in-
stitute action to recover any balance due on 
the obligation for which the trust deeds 
were given as security. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-32. Once a trust deed sale has 
been made, that remedy is the exclusive 
remedy under statute. Cox v. Green, 696 
P 2d 1207 (Utah 1985). 
\\ e hold that the trustee's sale on Octo-
ber 28, 1983, va> properly advertised and 
that the notice published in the Salt Lake 
Tribune substantially complied with our 
statutory requirements. Inasmuch as the 
\ahdit\ of the sale was not affected by the 
minor typographical error, the trustee's 
leed validly convened to defendant all cf 
plamtifis' right, title, and interest in the 
property, subjec: only to plaintiffs' contuui-
lng liability ior any remaining deficiency, 
defendant's failure to bring a deficiency 
action within three months after the sale of 
the property terminated all of plaintiffs' 
remaining obligations, and defendant's at-
tempt at rescheduling the same property 
for a second sale was improper as a matter 
of law. 
The judgment is reversed. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, 
having disqualified himself, does not 
participate herein. 
KtYhUMBlRSYSTl i 3> 
TRUE-FLO MECHANICAL SYSTEMS, 
INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, De-
partment of Emplo\ment Security, De-
fendant. 
No. 860281. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 9, 1987. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 21, 1987. 
Board of Review of Industrial Commis-
sion found that electrical contractor was 
successor for purposes of charging prede-
cessor's unpaid unemployment benefit 
costs to electrical contractor's account m 
determining contractor's contribution rate. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that' 
(1) contractor "acquired" substantially all 
assets of its predecessor for purposes of 
charging predecessor's unpaid unemploy-
ment benefit costs to contractor's account, 
even though contractor leased assets from 
actual purchasers; (2) evidence that prede-
cessor advised Department of Employment 
Security to close its employer's accourt 
following sale of its assets, together with 
evidence that predecessor filed wage report 
for last quarter showing no payroll, was 
sufficient to support finding of Eoard of 
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count" regulations are promulgated not in nominal damages for lessors* interference 
conformity with the applicable provisions with his leasehold interest, 
of the A.P.A.22 Remanded. 
Reversed and remanded. 
FITZGERALD, J., not participating. 
O I KEf MUMBER SYSTEM 
^
 b
 - - +J 
Steve E. B. COOPER, d/b/a Cooper Ex-
cavating & Construction Company, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Charles L. CARLSON and Margaret J. 
Carlson, Appellees. 
No. 1769. 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
July 16, 1973. 
Lessors brought action against lessee 
to recover 15 cents per cubic yard of gravel 
removed by lessee in addition to $1,000 fee, 
specified in written lease and for lessee's 
alleged abuse of legal process and inter-
ference with private property. The lessee 
filed a counterclaim for interference with 
his leasehold interests. The Fourth Judi-
cial District, Fairbanks District, Gerald J. 
VanHoomissen, J., rendered judgment gen-
erally in favor of the lessee but refused to 
award lessee costs and attorney's fees and 
the lessee appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Boochever, J., held that where trial court 
ruled in lessee's favor on central issue of 
the case, lessee was the "prevailing party" 
and was entitled to award of costs even 
though he did not prevail on argument that 
judgment should have been entered for 
22. Appellee has expressed the concern that 
"[i]f the early count procedure must be 
enacted by the promulgation of regula-
tions pursuant to the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act, then the remainder of the 
Lieutenant Governor's instructions are 
also subject to attack on the same basis." 
Since only the regulations implementing 
the "early count" statute were challenged 
511 P.2d—82V* 
1. Costs <£=32(3) 
In action instituted by lessors against 
lessee, where lessee prevailed on central 
issue of whether lease agreement constitut-
ed the complete agreement between par-
ties and trial court held that lessee had paid 
full price due under contract and had acted 
properly in securing assistance of state 
troopers and moving lessors' cattle truck 
which blocked access to property, lessee was 
the "prevailing party" and was entitled to 
award of costs even though lessee did not 
prevail on argument that he was entitled 
to nominal damages for lessors' interfer-
ence with his leasehold interest. AS 
09.60.010; Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 
54(d), 82(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Costs 032 (3 ) 
Party may be the "prevailing party" 
within rule pertaining to award of costs 
if he is successful with regard to the main 
issues in the action. AS 09.60.010; Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rules 54(d), 82(a). 
3. Appeal and Error C=>984(5) 
Costs C=>I72 
Award of attorney's fees is discre-
tionary with trial judge and is reviewable 
on appeal only for abuse of discretion. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 82(a)(1). 
4. Costs C=>I72 
Though award of attorney's fees to 
prevailing party is not mandatory, denial 
of motion for such fees may not be arbi-
trary or capricious or result from im-
in the instant action, we decline to con-
sider the validity of other election regula-
tions which may not have been promul-
gated in conformity with the A.P.A. We 
note, however, that the promulgation of 
such latter election regulations in com-
pliance with the A.P.A. could easily be 
accomplished by the lieutenant governor 
prior to the next general election. 
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proper motive. Rules of Civil P rocedure , 
rule 8 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) . 
Joseph \V. Sheehan, of Rice, Hoppner , 
Blair & Associates, Fa i rbanks , for appel-
lant. 
E d w a r d A. Merdes, of Merdes , Schaible, 
Staley & DeLisio, Fa i rbanks , for appellees. 
O P I N I O N 
Before R A B I N O W I T Z , C. J., C O N -
N O R , E R W I N , F I T Z G E R A L D and 
B O O C H E V E R , J J . 
I. The following cases involved \ anous as-
pects of questions pertaining to the award 
of attorneys fees: Macn v. United 
States, ,353 F 2 d S04 (9th Cir. 1965); 
Ma2vo v J. C Pestier Co, lac, 512 P2d 
575 (Alaska, 1973) ; Hodges v. Mock, 501 
P2d 1355 (Alaska 1972); De Witt v. 
Liberty Leasing Co. of Alaska, I n c , 499 
P.2d 509 (Alaska 1972) ; State v Ab-
bott, 49$ P2d 712 (Alaska 1972); 
Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C R. Lewis 
Co, Inc , 497 P 2d 312 (Alaska 1972); 
Miller v Wilkes, 496 P 2d 176 (Alaska 
1972) ; Stauber v. Granger, 495 P 2d 67 
(Alaska 1972) ; Har t v. Wolff, 489 P 2d 
114 (Aliska 1971); Ferrell v. Baxter, 
484 P2d 250 (Alaska 1971); Palfy v. 
Rice. 473 P2d 606 (Alaska 1970) ; Con-
nelly \ Peede, 459 P 2 d 362 (Alaska 
1969); Froehcher v. Hadley, 442 P 2 d 
51 (Alaska 1968) ; Dale v. Greater An-
chorage Area Borough, 439 P 2d 790 
(Alaska 196S) ; Beauheu v. Elliott, 434 
P 2d 665 (Alaska 1967) ; Albntton v. 
Estate of Larson. 428 P 2d 379 (xUaska 
1967) , McDonough v. Lee, 420 P 2d 459 
(Alaska 1966) ; Kenai Power Corp. \ . 
Strandberg. 415 P 2d 659 (Alaska 1966) ; 
Patrick v. Sedwick, 413 P 2d 169 (Alaska 
1966) ; Decker v Aurora Motors, I n c , 
409 P2J 3D3 /AtesX* lS>8d) ; Preferred 
General Agency of Alaska, Inc. v. Raf-
fetto, 391 P2d 951 (Aliska 1964) ; Dav-
ulsen v. Kirkland, 362 P 2d 1068 (Alaska 
1961). 
2. Alaska Civ R. 54(d) provides: 
Costs. Except when express provi-
sion therefor is made either in a statute 
of the state or in these rules, costs shall 
be allctced as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court othericise directs 
The procedure for the taxing of costs 
by the clerk and review of his action 
by the court shall be governed by Rule 
79. (Emphasis added.) 
B O O C H E V E R , Jus t ice . 
This case presents ano ther facet of the 
often perplexing problems involving the 
award of costs and a t to rney ' s fees under 
applicable Alaska law. 1 Cooper contends 
that he was the "preva i l ing p a r t ) " within 
the rneaning of this court ' s interpretat ion of 
A S 00 60.010 and Alaska Civil Rules 54(d) 
and 8 2 ( a ) , and that it was an abuse of dis-
cret ion for the tr ial judge to re tuse to 
a w a r d costs and a t to rney ' s fees.2 
T h e suit a rose out of a dispute over the 
pr ies to be paid for gravel taken from the 
Car lsons ' property by the Cooper E \ c a \ a t -
Alaska Civ R. S2(a) provide-
Allouance to Prevailing Party 
as Costs. 
(1) Unless the court, in its discre-
tion, ot/icrwfse <(ireeti, the following 
Schedule of attorney's fees will be ad-
hered to in fixing su( li tees for the 
tmrty recovering anv monev judgment 
therein, as part of the costs of the ac-
tion allowed bv law: 
Attorney's Fees in \ierage Cases 
With- Non-
Con- out Con-
tested Trial tested 
First $2,000 25% 20% 15% 
\Text $3,000 20% 15% 12 3 % 
\Text $5,000 15% 12 3 % 10% 
Over $10,000 10% 7.5% 5% 
Should no recoien/ be had, attorney's 
fees for the prevailing party may be 
fixed by the court as a part of the costs 
o/ the action, in its discretion, m a 
reasonable amount. 
(2) In actions where the monev judg-
ment is not an accurate criteria [sic] 
for determining the fee to be allowed 
to the prevailing side, the <ourt shall 
^ward a fee commensurate with the 
Amount and value of legal services 
rendered. 
(3) The affowance of attornev's fees 
by the court in conformance with the 
foregoing s< hedule is not to be con-
strued as tixing the fees between at-
torney and client. (Emphasis added ) 
A&j 09 60 010 provides: 
Costs allowed pi evading party Ex-
cept as otherwise provided bv statute, 
*he biipreme court shall detei mine by 
hule or order what costs, if any, inilud-
hig attorney fees, shall be alloucd the 
brevaihng party m any case. (Em-
phasis added.) 
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ing and Construction Company. The 
gravel was used to perform resurfacing 
and upgrading of the Remington Road, near 
Delta Junction, Alaska, pursuant to a con-
tract with the State of Alaska. 
The Carlsons maintained that in addition 
to the $1,000 lease fee specified in the 
written lease, Cooper had orally agreed 
to pay 15? per cubic yard for the gravel 
removed. The evidence established that 
94,850 cubic yards of gravel were removed 
from the Carlsons' property. 
In addition to suing for this alleged con-
tract price for the gravel, the Carlsons 
maintained that when they had tried to close 
the gate to their property (after Cooper had 
refused to give an accounting or payment 
for gravel removed) and had placed their 
cattle truck across the roadway to the 
property, that Cooper had secured the as-
sistance of two state troopers who inter-
ceded on his behalf without any legal proc-
ess or authority. They also maintained 
that Cooper had used an earth moving ma-
chine to move the cattle truck, and then 
immobilized it by piling gravel around it. 
For these actions, they asked for $25,000 
in punitive damages. 
By way of answer, Cooper maintained 
that the written lease was the full and com-
plete agreement with respect to the gravel 
removed from the property. Thus, he 
maintained that $1,000 was all that was 
due, and that it had been paid. He denied 
the claims of abuse of legal process (use 
of state troopers) and interference with 
private property (immobilizing the cattle 
truck). In addition, in an amended an-
swer filed after a pretrial conference, 
Cooper filed a counterclaim for interfer-
ence with the Company's leasehold interests. 
While the trial jr.dge did find that the 
Carlsons were the legal owners of the 
property and that the lease agreement was 
ambiguous, he also found that the wfritten 
lease was the full and complete agreement 
with respect to the taking of gravel. Since 
the $1,000 was paid, he held that Cooper 
was in proper possession of the property 
during the incidents at issue, and that there 
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was no duty to pay 15e" per cubic yard for 
the gravel removed or to give an account-
ing. 
The judge found that Carlson had in fact 
blocked Cooper's access to the property, 
and that Cooper had secured the assistance 
of two state troopers and had moved the 
cattle truck. He found that Cooper had a 
right to do this, however, since the block-
age was a "wrongful interference with de-
fendant Cooper's lease interest in said 
property". 
With respect to the counterclaim, the 
court found that there was in fact an inter-
ference by Carlson with a valid lease-hold 
interest of Cooper, but that no damages due 
to this interference were shown. 
* In conformity with these findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, the trial judge 
held that the Carlsons were to take noth-
ing by way of Counts I and II of their 
complaint, and that Cooper was to take 
nothing by way of his counterclaim. Coop-
er moved for an order awarding costs and 
attorney's fees, and an entry of judgment 
awarding nominal damages on the counter-
claim. This motion was denied. 
The sole question presented on this ap-
peal is whether the trial court erred in 
failing to award costs and attorney's fees 
to Cooper. We thus do not reach the ques-
tion of whether the court should have 
awarded nominal damages on the counter-
claim. 
The trial court did not set forth its rea-
sons for refusing to award costs and at-
torney's fees. It is conceivable that the 
court concluded, as is argued by the Carl-
sons, that Cooper was not the prevailing 
party due to his failure to secure an award 
of damages on his counterclaim for inter-
ference with his leasehold rights. On the 
other hand, the court may have considered 
that Cooper was the prevailing party, but 
that in the exercise of discretion an award 
of costs and attorney's fees should be de-
nied. 
When the central issues of the case and 
the trial court's resolution of them are con-
sidered, it is clear that Cooper was the pre-
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vailing party. Cooper prevailed on the cen-
tral issue of the lease agreement constitut-
ing the sole and complete agreement be-
tween the parties with respect to removing 
the gravel. Thus, it was held that he had 
paid the full price due under the contract, 
was properly in control of the property and 
did not have to give an accounting. He ' 
prevailed on the issue of the validity of 
his actions in securing the assistance of 
state troopers and in moving the cattle 
truck. Cooper also prevailed on the issue 
of whether there was an improper inter-
ference with his leasehold interest by Carl-
son in blocking access to the property. 
Thus, the only question Cooper failed to 
prevail on was the argument that the judg-
ment should be entered for nominal dam-
ages where there is an interference with 
a leasehold interest and no evidence of 
damages. 
[1,2] Even though Cooper did not pre-
vail on that one subsidiary issue, it is clear 
from this court's previous interpretations 
of the Civil Rules that a party may be the 
"prevailing party" if he is successful with 
regard to the "main issues in the action". 
The leading case in this regard is Buza v. 
Columbia Lumber Co., 395 P.2d 511 (Alaska 
1964). In the lower court, Columbia had 
sued Buza for both compensatory and 
punitive damages for conversion of logs 
and trespass. Buza had counterclaimed for 
the value of the logs. Columbia prevailed 
on its claim for conversion but did not re-
ceive any additional damages. The counter-
claim of Buza was denied. With respect 
to the contention that the award of costs 
to Columbia was error since it did not re-
cover the full amount of relief prayed for, 
this court stated at page 514: 
It is true that Columbia did not recover 
the full measure of the relief it had 
prayed for but it was nonetheless the 
prevailing party and the only prevailing 
party. Judgment was entered for Colum-
bia, declaring it to be owner "of the per-
sonal property covered by this law suit" 
and ordering the appellants' counterclaim 
dismissed with prejudice. 
The dictionary states that "prevailing 
applies esp. to that which is predomi-
^ nant," and it has been established by case 
law that the prevailing party to a suit 
is the one who successfully prosecutes the 
action or successfully defends against 
it, prevailing on the main issue, even 
though not to the extent of the original 
contention. He is the one in whose favor 
the decision or verdict is rendered and 
the judgment entered. (Footnotes omit-
ted.) 
The most recent case to follow Buza v. 
Columbia Lumber Co. is the 1972 case of 
DeWitt v. Liberty Leasing Co., 499 P.2d 
599 (Alaska 1972). In the court below, 
DeWitt had received a judgment on a con-
struction contract claim of $17,736.11 and 
Liberty Leasing had prevailed on a counter-
claim to the amount of $93.64. In revers-
ing the trial court's determination that nei-
ther party was entitled to costs or attor-
ney's fees, Justice Erwin stated for the 
majority: 3 
In Buza v. Columbia Lumber Co., 395 
P.2d 511, 514 (Alaska 1964), this court 
discussed the meaning of the term "pre-
vailing party" . . .. Applying this 
standard to the case at bar, appellant 
clearly prevailed in the litigation be-
low . . . . A s we stated in Nordin 
Const. Co. v. City of Nome [sic], 4S9 
P.2d 455, 474 (Alaska 1971), "[a] simple 
balancing of the recovery in favor of 
each party makes it clear that [appellant] 
was the prevailing party in this law suit. 
. . . " Moreover, appellant prevailed 
on most of the issues disputed at trial. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
The Carlsons contend that the counter-
claim could have involved damages far in 
excess o f those of the plaintiff's claim. 
Since the court found that no damages had 
been proved under the counterclaim, the) 
argue that they should be regarded as the 
3. Accord, Nordin Constr. Co. v. City of Nome, 4S9 P.2d 455, 474 (Alaska 1971). 
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prevailing party or, in the alternative, that 
neither party prevailed. 
In Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C. R. 
Lewis Co., 497 R2d 312 (Alaska 1972), we 
held that a litigant who is successful in de-
feating a claim of great potential liability 
may be the prevailing party even though the 
other side is successful in receiving an af-
firmative recovery. In that case Lewis 
successfully defended against a contract 
claim of SI 19,663.12. Recovery against 
Lewis was permitted in quantum meruit for 
material salvaged in the amount of $7,-
363.12, but it was clear that Lewis had pre-
vailed on the principal issue. 
In the instant case, Cooper prevailed on 
every liability issue, and was unsuccessful 
only in his argument that he was entitled 
to nominal damages on his counterclaim. 
As indicated above, we thus conclude that 
he was the prevailing party. 
As the prevailing party he was entitled to 
an award of costs. AS 09.60.010 specifies 
that "the supreme court shall determine 
by rule or order what costs, if any, in-
cluding attorney fees shall be allowed the 
prevailing party. . . ." Alaska Civil 
Rule 54(d) specifies that "[e]xcept when 
express provision therefor is made either 
in a statute of the state or in these rules, 
costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court othenuise 
directs." (Emphasis added.) 
In DeJVitt we stated: 
We do not decide whether a denial of 
all costs would be justified in an ex-
treme case of a vexatious prevailing party 
4. 499 P.2d 599, 602 n. 13. 
5. In Albritton v. Estate of Larson, 42S P. 
2d 379 (Alaska 1967) (involving attor-
ney's fees where the issue was an offer 
of judgment under Rule 68), the court 
stated through then Justice Rabinowitz: 
As we have noted, Civil Rule 82(a) 
provides for the allowance of attorney's 
fees as costs to "the party recovering 
any money judgment," to "the prevail-
ing party," and "to the prevailing side." 
In our view, we need not decide wheth-
er, under the circumstances of this rec-
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unreasonably prolonging the litigation 
and substantially increasing its costs. 
The trial court in such a case would at 
least be justified in disallowing particu-
lar items on the cost bill as unnecessary 
to the litigation. (Citations omitted.) 4 
The trial court has set forth no reasons 
for its refusal to award costs. Although 
it may be argued that the filing of Cooper's 
counterclaim for interference with its lease-
hold rights was unnecessary in view of 
the facts that the lease had terminated and 
that ii- > damages were proved, we do not be-
lieve that this is an appropriate case to 
authorize a denial of all costs to the pre-
vailing party. The counterclaim raised a 
peripheral issue only. Since the case will 
have to be remanded in any event, the 
trial court should determine whether par-
ticular items on the cost bill should be dis-
allowed as unnecessary to the litigation, 
but should award proper items of costs. 
With reference to the more difficult ques-
tion pertaining to the disallowance of at-
torney's fees, Cooper was the prevailing 
party. Nevertheless, the trial court in its 
discretion for valid reasons might deny 
the award of attorney's fees. Alaska Civil 
Rule 82(a)(1) specifies in part: 
Should no recovery be had, attorney's 
fees for the prevailing party may be 
fixed by the court as a part of the 
costs of the action, in its discretion, in a 
reasonable amount. (Emphasis added.) 
[3] We have recognized in several 
cases that the award is discretionary with 
the trial judge 5 and is reviewable on appeal 
only for abuse.6 
ord. appellants were prevailing parties 
within the meaning of Civil Rule 54(d) 
and Civil Rule 82(a)(1). Assuming 
that appellants were the prevailing par-
ties, in the circumstances under which 
the question was presented to the trial 
judge for determination, he wa^ vested 
with wide discretion as to whether at-
torney's fees should be awarded. 
On the record in this appeal we can-
not say that the superior court abused 
its discretion in failing to award at-
6. See note 6 on page 1310. 
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In the case of M - B Contracting Co., Inc. 
v. Davis and Albri t ton v. Es ta te of Larson, 7 
valid reasons were set for th for denying 
the allowance of a t to rney ' s fees. In the 
M - B Contract ing Co., Inc. , case the em-
ployer prevailed, and in a f f i rming the trial 
cour t ' s failure to a w a r d a t to rney ' s fees 
against Davis ( the c la imant-employee) we 
s ta ted: 
This is not a s i tuat ion in which it 
might have been said tha t the injured 
employee has appealed on frivolous 
grounds and should the re fore be penal-
ized by the t axa t ion of an a t torney 's 
fee against him. Ins tead, it was the 
employer who had prosecuted the appeal, 
in this case r ightly so, but thereby plac-
ing the employee in a posit ion where he 
had to engage counsel to represent him 
in the superior cour t on wha t was then. 
a debatable question oi law. 8 
tomey's fees to appellants. (Emphasis 
added, footnotes omitted.) 
A similar result was reached in M-B 
Contracting Co., Inc. v. Davis, 399 P.2d 
433, 437 (Alaska 1965) where the court 
upheld the refusal to award fees to the 
"prevailing party" : 
The appellant's claim of entitlement to 
attorney's fees as the prevailing party 
presents a somewhat different problem. 
In Civil Rule 82 is published a schedule 
of attorney's fees to be adhered to by the 
court in fixing such fees as a part of the 
costs of the action for the party recov-
ering a money judgment therein, "[u]n-
less the court, in its discretion, otherwise 
directs . " Then there is added 
this short paragraph: 
"Should no recovery be had, attor-
ney's fees for the prevailing party 
may he fixed by the court as a part 
of the costs of the action, in its dis-
cretion, in a reasonable amount." (Em-
phasis added by court.) 
The wording of this paragraph leaves 
it in the sound discretion of the trial 
court to decide, first of all, ichether the 
prevailing party should receive an attor-
ney's fee at all . 
The appellant recognizes the broad dis-
cretion vested in the superior court by 
Civil Rule S2 in the matter of awarding 
attorney's fees, but urges that the court 
abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in withholding from the 
prevailing party an attorney's fee. Xo 
sufficient showing has been made, nor do 
In the Albritton case, it was held that the 
tr ial court had proper ly refused to award 
a t torney ' s fees due to the te rms of the 
stipulation the par t ies had entered into.9 
[4] Whi le this cour t has made it clear 
that the a w a r d of a t torney ' s fees to the 
prevai l ing pa r ty is not mandatory , it is 
equally clear tha t the denial of a motion 
for such fees may not be a rb i t ra ry or ca-
pricious or for some improper motive. 
T h e most recent s ta tement of the necessity 
of a reasonable basis for denying the mo-
tion is contained in De W i t t v. Liberty 
Leasing Co., 499 P.2d 599, 602 (Alaska 
1972). Jus t ice E r w i n cited the language 
of P re fe r red Genera l Agency of Alaska, 
Inc. v. Raf fe t to , 391 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska 
1964): 
T h e purpose of Civil Rule 82 in pro-
viding for the allowance of attorney's 
we find one in the record, that the trial 
judge abused his discretion in denying an 
attorney's fee to the appellant. (Empha-
sis added, footnotes omitted.) 
6. With regard to what constitutes an abuse 
of discretion, this court has stated: 
[T]he matter of awarding attorney's 
fees is committed to the discretion of 
the trial court. We shall interfere with 
the exercise of that discretion only 
where it has been abused. An abuse 
of discretion is established where it ap-
pears that the trial court's determina-
tion as to attorney's fees was mani-
festly unreasonable. (Footnotes omit-
ted.) Palfy v. Rice, 473 P.2d 606, 
613 (Alaska 1970). 
In that case, the court held that an award 
of $3,700 to a party who had successfully 
defended a suit (i. e., no "money judg-
ment") was "unreasonably low" due to 
the factually complex nature of the suit, 
the three and one-half years of prepara-
tion, the potential liability, the three 
weeks of trial, and collateral actions that 
were necessary for discovery. 
7. Cited in note 5, supra. 
8. M-B Contracting Co., Inc. v. Davis, 399 
P.2d 433. 437 (Alaska 106o). The case 
involved special considerations applicable 
only to certain provisions of the Alaska 
Workmen's Compensation Act (AS 23.30.-
145). 
9. Albritton v. Estate of Larson, 428 P.2d 
379 (Alaska 1967). 
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fees is to partially compensate a prevail-
ing party for the costs to which he has 
been put in the litigation in which he was 
involved. The rule was not designed to 
be used capriciously or arbitrarily, or 
as a vehicle for accomplishing any pur-
pose other than providing compensation 
where it is justified. (Footnote omit-
ted.)10 
On this basis, the court held that there was 
not sufficient evidence to support the denial 
as a penalty for prolonging the litigation. 
There may be valid reasons why the 
trial court in its discretion refused to award 
Cooper attorney's fees.11 As indicated pre-
viously, the court might have found that 
Cooper's counterclaim was interposed for 
the purpose of delay or confusion. The 
court might also have been affected by the 
equities of the situation.12 The court 
found that a binding contract had been 
entered into between the parties whereby 
Cooper took about $13,800 worth of gravel 
from the Carlsons' property and paid them 
only $1,000. While not finding the con-
tract unenforceable or modified by the al-
leged oral agreement to pay an additional 
15c" per yard, the court could have found 
it unconscionable to allow an additional 
sum for attorney's fees resulting from the 
Carlsons presenting a legitimately arguable 
claim. Similarly, the court could have 
considered that Cooper having prevailed on 
his highly favorable contract, should not 
also receive a "pound of flesh".13 
We are confronted with the difficulty of 
not knowing whether the court denied the 
fee in the exercise of its discretion or under 
the mistaken belief that Cooper was not the 
prevailing party. Accordingly, we find it 
necessary to remand the case to the trial 
court for the purpose of making a ruling 
as to allowable costs and also to determine 
whether attorney's fees should be allowed 
or denied in its discretion, in which event 
the reasons for exercising such discretion 
should be set forth. 
The case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Elinor B. AYDLETT, Appellant, 
v. 
Dale HAYNES and Howard C. Aydlett, 
Appellees. 
No. 1762. 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
July 13, 1073. 
Spouse of serviceman driving automo-
bile involved in three-vehicle collision 
brought suit against all three drivers, in-
cluding her husband. After entry of judg-
ment for plaintiff, her husband's motion to 
reduce amount awarded by amount allowed 
by jury for medical expenses was granted 
by the Superior Court, Third Judicial Dis-
trict, Anchorage, Edward V. Davis, J., and 
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Fitzgerald, J., held that where plaintiff had 
no independent and enforceable right to re-
ceive medical services from military medi-
cal facilities, collateral source rule did not 
apply to services received from such facili-
10. See De Witt v. Liberty Leasing Co., 
499 P.2d 599, 602 n. 12 (Alaska 1972), 
for other cases citing this language. 
11. There may be valid reasons other than 
those mentioned in this opinion for the 
exercise of the court's discretion. 
'2. We realize that referring to "equities" 
presents a rather ephemeral standard de-
pendent upon the sense of justice of the 
individual presiding. We do not intend 
to imply that in each case the court 
should evaluate the purity of color of the 
chargers on wl ch each side rides. We 
are well aware that judges may have 
difficulties in color perception, or even 
be color blind. Nevertheless, there are 
cases involving substantial litigable ques-
tions in which to require the losing party 
to pay a sizeable attorney's fee would ob-
viously be unwarranted. 
13. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, 
Act IV, Scene 1. 
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OWEN JONES & SONS, INC., formerly 
Jones Enterprises, Inc., and Empire West-
ern Ltd., formerly Western Ltd., d/b/a 
Jones-Western, a joint venture, Appellants, 
v. 
C. R. LEWIS COMPANY, Inc., Appellee. 
No. 1460. 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
May 19, 1972. 
Contractor sued subcontractor for re-
covery of progress payments on basis that 
contract provided for indemnification of 
contractor and subcontractor counter-
claimed for services rendered in installing 
plumbing in apartment building before it 
was destroyed by earthquake. The Superi-
or Court, Third Judicial District, Anchor-
age, Eben H. Lewis, J., held that collapse 
of building discharged subcontractor's obli-
gation to furnish further performance and 
that subcontractor was entitled to compen-
sation for its performance and subcontrac-
tor was liable for the amount by which 
value of its performance was exceeded by 
the amount of contractor's materials it sal-
vaged and the progress payments and or-
dered that subcontractor be awarded costs 
and attorney's fee, and contractor appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Connor, J., held that 
where subcontractor was prevailing party, 
award of $10,000 attorney's fee to subcon-
tractor was not abuse of discretion in view 
of potentially large liability of subcontrac-
tor. 
Affirmed. 
Boney, C. J., and Erwin, J., did not 
participate. 
I. Costs <S=>32(2) 
The party who obtains an affirmative 
recovery must be considered the "prevail-
ing party" within statute and rule authoriz-
ing award of costs to prevailing party. AS 
09.60.010; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
54(d). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Costs C=>32(2) 
Determination of which party prevails 
and is entitled to costs is within discretion 
of trial judge. AS 09.60.010; Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rule 54(d). 
3. Costs C=332(5) 
Where, subcontractor, in action by 
contractor against subcontractor for recov-
ery of progress payments, was entitled to 
compensation on quantum meruit basis for 
installing plumbing but was liable for the 
amount by which value of its performance 
was exceeded by amount of contractor's 
materials salvaged by subcontractor and 
progress payments, subcontractor was pre-
vailing party and entitled to costs. AS 09.-
60.010; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
54(d). 
4. CostsC=>l72 
Where subcontractor was prevailing 
party in action by contractor against sub-
contractor for recovery of progess pay-
ments, award of $10,000 attorney's fee to 
subcontractor was not abuse of discretion 
in view of potentially large liability of sub-
contractor. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
82(a) (2). 
E. G. Burton and Richard A. Helm, 
Burr, Pease & Kurtz, Inc., Anchorage, 
for appellants. 
Karl S. Johnstone, Nesbett & Johnstone, 
Anchorage, Lyle L. Iversen, and Josef 
Diamond, Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester, 
Seattle, Wash., for appellee. 
Before RABINOWITZ, CONNOR and 
BOOCHEVER, JJ. 
OPINION 
CONNOR, Justice. 
This is an appeal from an award of 
costs and attorney's fees granted to appel-
OWEN JONES & SONS, INC. 
Cite as, Alaska, 
lee at the conclusion of this action in the 
superior court. 
Appellants, Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. 
and Empire Western Ltd., a joint venture, 
entered into a subcontract agreement with 
C. R. Lewis Company, Inc., appellee, on 
July 3, 1963. Under the contract appellee 
agreed to furnish labor and materials nec-
essary to complete plumbing and other sys-
tems specified in the plans for the "Four 
Seasons Apartment" to be built in Anchor-
age, Alaska. The total contract price was 
$178,449.19. The contract also provided 
for progress payments, not to exceed 90% 
of the contract price. 
The partially completed "Four Seasons 
Apartment" was destroyed in the March 
27, 1964, earthquake. After the quake the 
appellants brought an action against appel-
lee to recover $119,663.12 that Jones-West-
ern had disbursed to C. R. Lewis Co. as 
progress payments. This claim was made 
under a clause of the contract calling for 
indemnification of the contractor by the 
subcontractor for all damages caused "by 
reason of the elements, from any other 
person or any other craft". The subcon-
tractor counter-claimed for $46,620.92 for 
services rendered and materials furnished 
before the collapse. 
At trial without a jury the superior 
court accepted Jones-Western's contention 
that the earthquake was within the indem-
nity clause of the contract, but the court 
held that this finding did not resolve the 
case, [t was the decision of the trial court 
that there could be no indemnification un-
der the contract to supply plumbing to the 
"Four Seasons Apartment" because the 
building, the subject matter of the contract, 
had been destroyed, thus discharging any 
1. "Costs allowed prevailing party. Except 
as otherwise provided by statute, the su-
preme court shall determine by rule or or-
der what costs, if any, including attorney 
fees, shall be allowed the prevailing par-
ty in any case." 
2. "Costs. Except when express provision 
therefor is made either in a statute of the 
497 P.2d—20V* 
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obligation on the subcontractor's part to 
furnish further performance. 
After finding that the building's destruc-
tion discharged the obligation of the par-
ties under the original contract, Judge 
Lewis held that C. R. Lewis Company was 
entitled to recover the cost of its perform-
ance from appellants on a quantum meruit 
basis. 
The trial court decided that the subcon-
tractor's services and materials supplied 
should be reasonably valued at approxi-
mately $142,300. From this figure a com-
putation was made which took into account 
the amount of progress payments 
($119,663.12) and the value of materials 
belonging to appellants which were sal-
vaged by appellee ($30,000), representing a 
total value received by appellee of 
$149,663.12. From this total was subtract-
ed the amount due to the appellee under 
the quantum meruit theory employed by 
the court, which left an excess of $7,363.12, 
the amount of judgment for appellants. 
Pursuant to this judgment the trial judge 
ordered that appellee be awarded costs and 
$10,000 attorney's fee. 
The resolution of this controversy re-
quires our decision on two issues. First, 
was it error to hold that appellee was the 
prevailing party in this action; and sec-
ond, did the trial court abuse its discretion 
in the amount of the award given ? 
Under AS 09.60.0101 and Rule 54(d),2 
Rules of Civil Procedure, it is clear that 
the prevailing party is entitled to costs. 
It is the contention of the appellants that 
only they could be considered the prevail-
ing parties in light of their affirmative re-
covery of $7,363.12 at the conclusion of the 
trial. 
[1,2] With this contention we cannot 
agree; it is not an immutable rule that the 
state or in these rules, costs shall be al-
lowed as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the court otherwise directs. The 
procedure for the taxing of costs by the 
clerk and review of his action by the court 
shall be governed by Rule 79." 
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party who obtains an affirmative recovery 
must be considered the prevailing party.3 
The decision of the trial court that appel-
lee was the prevailing party did not in-
volve an erroneous construction of either 
AS 09 60.010 or Rule 54(d). We are of 
the opinion that the determination of 
which party prevails in cases of this sort 
is, like the award of attorney's fees, within 
the discretion of the trial judge.4 
[3] This case is clearly distinguishable 
from Buza v. Columbia Lumber Company, 
395 P2d 511 (Alaska 1964). In Buza we 
affirmed an award of attorneys fees to 
plaintiff and held that he was the prevail-
ing party within the terms of the statute 
and rule, even though he did not obtain re-
fief to the extent urged in his compfaint. 
The mam issue in that case was the own-
ership of a quantity of logs, and the plain-
tiff proved his right to the logs although 
he was not able to obtain compensating or 
punitive damages. 
The instant case differs because the re-
covery of appellants was based only on an 
accounting for materials salvaged by the 
appellee.5 It was clear that the main issue 
had been resolved against appellants when 
the court found that appellee had no obli-
gation to refund its progress pa>ments un-
der the contract, the obligation having 
3 Haugland v. Canton, 250 Minn. 245, S4 
X.\V2<1 274 (Minn 1957) : Milner \. XPW 
Edmhurg School Disc, 2: l Af£ 3o7. 200 
S.W.2d 319 (1947); Xull \. Board of 
Comm'rs, 98 Okl. 16, 224 P. 159 (1924) , 
Wymer v. J>ngm)]o, 162 X.W 2t) 514 
(Iowa 1968) ; MtXrarv v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., 84 F 2d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 
1936). 
4. The following Alaska oases hold that the 
award of attorney's fees is within the 
discretion of the trial judge. McDonough 
v. Lee, 420 P 2d 459 (Alaska 1966) ; Pre-
ferred General Agency ot Alaska, Inc. v. 
Raffetto, 391 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska 
1964). 
been discharged by destruction of the sub-
ject matter. 
[4] Because we are of the opinion that 
the trial court was correct in deciding that 
the appellee was the prevailing party, we 
must also decide whether the amount of 
the award was proper. 
Under Rule 82(a) (2), Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court is empowered to 
"award a fee commensurate with the 
amount and \alue of legal services ren-
dered" when "the money judgment is not 
an accurate criteria [sic] for determining 
the fee to be allowed." 
It is clear from the record in this case 
that the court considered the efforts of ap-
pellee's counsel in defeating the appellants' 
cfaim for Si 19,663.12 ana the \afue of that 
effort in determining the amount of the at-
torneys fee awarded. The trial judge also 
considered the potential liability that 
threatened appellee.6 Finally, it is clear 
that the amount of attorney's fee was 
within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and such an award will not be dis-
turbed unless ;he court has exceeded that 
discretion." We find no reason to disturb 
the award in this case. 
Affirmed. 
BOXEY, C. J., and ERWIN, J., not par-
ticipating. 
5. This reco\er\ based on the accounting can 
be classified as an incidental recovery 
which will not he a sufficient reooverv to 
bar a partv who has defended a large 
claim fiom being considered a prevailing 
[urtj. ILuigland i. Canton, 250 Minn. 
245. S4 X.\V2d 274 (1957); Milner v. 
New IMinburg School Dist., 211 Ark. 337, 
200 S.W2d 319 (1947); Null \. Board 
of Comm'rs. 9S Okl. 16, 224 P. 159 (1924). 
6. Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250. 271 
(Alaska 1971). 
7. See oases cited note 4, supra. 
